Constructing Paths to Staff Mobility in the European Higher Education Area: from Individual to Institutional Responsibility

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Conor Cradden - January 2007
This Report has been prepared for the Bologna Process Official Seminar "Making Bologna a Reality - Mobility of Staff and Students" to be a basis for discussion and debate on the key topics
Constructing Paths to Staff Mobility in the European Higher Education Area: from Individual to Institutional Responsibility

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Executive Summary

1) What do we mean by academic staff mobility?
The mobility of academic staff can be justified on either socio-cultural or labour market grounds. In the former case, mobility is intended to benefit the HE system in both the ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries via the exchange of knowledge, experience and practice. In the latter case, the needs of a single institution or HE system are privileged. It is more useful to categorise the different types of academic staff mobility according to their ‘institutional anchoring’ than the length of time a member of staff is away from his or her home country. There are four types of anchoring: visits, exchanges and sabbaticals; grants and fellowships; untenured employment; and tenured employment. In combination with the two justifications for mobility this gives rise to four categories of mobility: traditional academic exchange; early career training and experience; importing cheap academic labour; and targeting the international labour market.

2) Drain, Gain or Circulation? Applying the Literature on the Migration of Highly Skilled and Educated Labour to the Academic Case
The literature on the migration of highly skilled and educated workers shows that there is a high level of interest in policies concerned with the movement of highly skilled workers. These policies can be divided into those that seek to encourage migration, and those that seek to address the problems it potentially creates in ‘sending’ countries. There appears to be no consensus on whether highly-skilled migration is in practice a benefit to sending countries. The theoretical case is ambiguous, and the evidence about mobility and its effects is insufficient to allow a balanced judgement to be made. Hence, whether migration results in a ‘brain drain’ must ultimately be treated as an empirical question. At the same time, the risks that migration carries for sending countries seem sufficiently real that the construction of an open-border regime for highly-skilled labour demands the introduction of policies to combat or mitigate the effects of brain drain. In general, these policies involve the encouragement of ‘brain circulation’ via the permanent or temporary return or migrants to their home countries, and providing active support for diaspora networks. In the specific case of higher education, the most fruitful policy direction would appear to be the development of non-commercial forms of research and teaching cooperation.

3) Obstacles to academic staff mobility
Obstacles can be categorized according to the point in the process of staff mobility at which they have their obstructive effect; and according to whether the perspective of the individual or the HE institution is adopted. Great care needs to be taken in the definition of obstacles. What can appear from one perspective as a bureaucratic obstruction to staff recruitment can from a different standpoint appear as an entirely reasonable piece of employment regulation designed to prevent exploitation and to maintain salaries and working conditions at an acceptable level. Certain theoretical arguments suggest that this difference in perception has parallels in the academic literature on labour markets. There is a strong current in the academic debate that rejects the neoliberal assumption that deregulation is necessarily a good thing. Hence, removing obstacles to mobility must not be conflated with the simple deregulation of the academic labour market. Certain obstacles to mobility are also justifiable from the socio-cultural perspective. HE systems and institutions have a right to protect national and regional cultures of knowledge and learning, and to take steps to avoid cultural homogenisation.

4) A statistical picture of the European Higher Education Area
The member states of the Bologna Process can be organised into four (geographically non-contiguous) zones, according to certain of their economic and political characteristics. The data suggests that demographic change is likely to be uneven across the EHEA -
although a decline in the university-age population is almost universal – and that existing differences in economic performance will persist for some time. With respect to HE systems, the rate of increase in student numbers has been faster among the less wealthy member states. Perhaps not surprisingly, a considerably higher proportion of students in these wealthier states are enrolled on courses in science and health than in the other participating HE systems. The participation of foreign students is only of any real significance in the best-resourced HE systems, where it has recently also been rapidly increasing. Overall participation in initial HE has been increasing almost everywhere, and in most participating states is nearing 50%. However, the average participation rate is closer to 21% in the poorest group of states. The average number of students per member of teaching staff - the student:staff ratio - has been declining in the wealthier states, but increasing almost everywhere else. From the limited information that is available, it appears that young researchers are the most mobile category of staff, that the ‘hard’ sciences account for a greater proportion of mobile staff than their presence in the population as a whole, and that well-resourced institutions are responsible for the greater part of foreign staff recruitment. Temporary mobility for teaching purposes is clearly less ‘market-driven’, with no obvious distinction between the better- and less-well-resourced HE systems in terms of their propensity to participate in exchange. Finally, data about graduates of the European University Institute shows that the UK is by some way the most popular destination for those seeking permanent academic posts outside their home country.

5) The future pattern and effect of academic staff mobility
A simple model of indefinite migration suggests that obstacles and incentives to mobility intervene to modify the migratory flows that would otherwise arise from supply/push and demand/pull factors. Economic growth and development, the overall demand for initial HE and the distribution of that demand across disciplines were identified as the principal factors. There is every reason to be optimistic about the economic prospects of the poorer BP member states, but in many cases convergence is some way off. The demographic downturn will be sharper in the poorer member states. The effect of these changes is not given. The relationship between economic growth and HE funding, and that between the demographic downturn and the overall demand for HE depend on policy choices. Principal among these are decisions at national level about HE resourcing and decisions at the level of the HE system and individual HEIs about how demand is managed, particularly with respect to student recruitment and the terms and conditions of academic employment. Many of these choices are in effect choices about how to deal with obstacles to mobility. With respect to strictly temporary mobility - traditional academic exchange - the problems encountered ‘on the ground’ are principally financial and administrative, but there is also a widespread problem with the ‘prestige’ attached to mobility for teaching purposes. Finally, in terms of what is possible within the BP itself, the evidence on obstacles to mobility points to the need for convergent informal change in the culture of HE management rather than detailed regulation.

6) Conclusion
When it comes to policy on staff mobility, it is not enough simply to take national borders out of the equation and to leave the rest up to the choices of individual members of staff. Rather, the institutions and HE systems in the Bologna area have to recognise and take responsibility for the impact of their actions on the international academic labour market and pursue proactive and concerted policies if mobility is to become a reality. Staff mobility can only be of universal benefit if these actions are properly thought through and properly coordinated at the institutional, national and European levels. The means of building a genuine commitment to staff mobility will need to be addressed in the period following the London interministerial conference, and a proactive mobility policy must be a key permanent feature of the Bologna structure.
Introduction

Education International (EI) is the global union federation that brings together unions representing staff working in education and training. In 2005, at the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, EI’s pan-European structure was formally recognised as a consultative partner in the Bologna Process (BP). As its contribution to the ongoing debate in the run-up to the next BP interministerial conference in May 2007, EI - together with the UK’s University and College Union (UCU) and ESIB, the National Unions of Students in Europe - is organising a seminar on staff and student mobility to be held in London in February 2007. This report is one of two background papers intended to inform discussion at that seminar. The other report will deal with student mobility.

The author of the current report, Conor Cradden, is an independent social researcher who works primarily on labour issues. He was formerly head of research for the UK higher education union the Association of University Teachers, one of the two unions that recently merged to form the UCU. While the report was commissioned by EI, and while the author has benefited from the advice and help of its affiliated organisations and officers, particularly the members of its Higher Education and Research Standing Committee, its contents and conclusions remain the sole responsibility of the author and should not be taken as reflecting the position of EI or its affiliates.

Background and Aims of the Report

The Bologna Process is a process of intergovernmental cooperation whose central aim is the creation of the ‘European Higher Education Area’ (EHEA) via the introduction of convergent reforms of national higher education systems. The intention is that the EHEA be established by 2010. A secondary aim is to promote the European system of higher education worldwide. There are 46 participating countries, whose HE systems together have something like 32 million students and two and a quarter million teaching staff.¹

The BP is independent of the European Union (EU), but it is nevertheless closely tied to it both geographically and institutionally. All 27 of the EU’s member states are participants. Of the 18 non-EU members, three are candidates for membership (Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey), three more are members of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), and one has extensive bilateral economic and social treaties with the EU (Switzerland). For its part, the European Commission has accepted the BP as an integral element of the education and training policy landscape. Indeed, it is usually treated as having equal status with the EU’s own European Research Area.

At the same time, it is worth remembering that within the EU, education issues are considered to be a national responsibility. Thus the BP is an additional process of intergovernmental policy coordination that operates in an area in which the EU has only limited influence, and in which the conventional ‘legislative’ approach to decision-making is thought to be inappropriate. As well as being both larger and more diverse than the EU, then, the BP is a qualitatively different type of supranational institution. Its decisions are binding in honour only, and the Bologna convergence relies for its functioning on the cooperation and good will of the participants.

Although it builds upon fundamental principles established in the 1988 Magna Charta Universitatum and the Sorbonne Declaration of 1998, the Bologna Process itself began in

¹ UNESCO Institute for Statistics
1999, when 29 countries signed the Bologna Declaration. Its main aim is to encourage a convergence of higher education (HE) systems in certain key areas such as qualifications structures, quality assurance, and credit transfer, with a view to ensuring (a) that students and staff are able to move between national HE systems with the minimum of difficulty, and (b) that HE qualifications are understood and recognised in all participating countries, regardless of the system in which they were awarded. Thus, the BP aims to encourage the mobility of highly skilled labour in two ways. First, it offers students the opportunity to experience different European cultures while they are still studying, whether directly, via stays in HE institutions abroad, or indirectly, via the presence of foreign academic staff in their home institutions. Second, it promotes post-graduation mobility by ensuring that graduates can expect the same treatment in all of Europe’s national labour markets.

Thus far, it is the second of these policies that have dominated the agenda. To the limited extent that the first has featured in debate and action, student mobility has benefited from considerably more attention than staff mobility. Indeed, anyone leafing through the voluminous BP documentation could hardly fail to be struck by the apparent contradiction between the intentions and actions of the participants in the area of staff mobility. On the one hand, the references to staff mobility in the various statements of principle and end-of-summit communiqués are clear and unambiguous (see box on page 8). Staff mobility is presented as absolutely essential; a central part of the Bologna strategy. On the other, remarkably little time and effort has been spent on research into, or analysis and discussion of staff mobility in the specific context of the BP. Still less has any coherent, concrete strategy to promote staff mobility been formulated or agreed. This has left us in a situation in which, as the Council of Europe argues, ‘the “Bologna vision” of mobility is incomplete and inconsistently articulated.’ (Council of Europe 2006)

The aim of this project is precisely to consider what a ‘complete and consistently articulated’ vision of staff mobility might involve. In pursuing this aim, we take it as given that the test of the value of mobility policies should be the degree of fairness with which the costs and benefits of mobility are distributed, whether between the different national HE systems, or between staff and institutions.

There are four principal objectives that arise from this overall aim:

1. To introduce a much greater degree of clarity to the concepts and ideas used in the policy discussion on mobility.

2. To provide an overview of the economic and demographic characteristics of the ‘Bologna area’ and its different HE systems, including the existing patterns of staff mobility.

3. To consider the likely future patterns of academic mobility and to highlight the difficulties that might arise as a consequence of the very uneven state of economic and political development within the Bologna area.

4. To draw these threads together into some conclusions and recommendations about the kind of staff mobility policy that would best serve the needs of HE staff and institutions in Europe.
Mobility: The Statements of Principle

The Bologna Declaration
With respect to teachers, researchers and administrative staff, one of the six core objectives of the Bologna Process is the “Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free movement with particular attention to ... [the] recognition and valorisation of periods spent in a European context researching, teaching and training.”

The Prague Communiqué
“Ministers reaffirmed that the objective of improving the mobility of students, teachers, researchers and administrative staff as set out in the Bologna Declaration is of the utmost importance. Therefore, they confirmed their commitment to pursue the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of students, teachers, researchers and administrative staff and emphasized the social dimension of mobility.”

The Berlin Communiqué
“Mobility of students and academic and administrative staff is the basis for establishing a European Higher Education Area. Ministers emphasise its importance for academic and cultural as well as political, social and economic spheres... They reaffirm their intention to make every effort to remove all obstacles to mobility within the European Higher Education Area.”

The Bergen Communiqué
“We recognise that mobility of students and staff among all participating countries remains one of the key objectives of the Bologna Process. Aware of the many remaining challenges to be overcome, we reconfirm our commitment to facilitate the portability of grants and loans where appropriate through joint action, with a view to making mobility within the EHEA a reality. We shall intensify our efforts to lift obstacles to mobility by facilitating the delivery of visa and work permits and by encouraging participation in mobility programmes. We urge institutions and students to make full use of mobility programmes, advocating full recognition of study periods abroad within such programmes.”
1 What do We Mean by Academic Mobility?

Staff in higher education institutions (HEIs) are conventionally divided into four categories: teacher-researchers, that is, lecturers or professors who divide their time between teaching and research; teachers, whose responsibilities are purely pedagogical; researchers, whose role is to design and carry out research programmes and who have little or no teaching responsibility; and administrative staff. Although in principle references to staff mobility in the context of the Bologna process include all four categories, in this report we concentrate almost exclusively on the categories of HE teachers and teacher-researchers. There are two reasons for this. First, the mobility of researchers within Europe has already been the subject of an extensive research and policy-making effort. If staff mobility policy within the European Higher Education Area is to be distinctive and effective as a means of realising the goals of the BP, and not simply a re-iteration of existing research mobility policies, the emphasis has to be on higher education taken as a whole. Second, the exclusion of administrative staff was not deliberate. We have quite simply been unable to find any existing research on administrative staff mobility that we might draw upon to inform the project.

1.1 Why move? The Reasons for Academic Mobility

In the context of the Bologna Process, the value of staff mobility is so frequently taken as given that the reasons why it might be of value for HE institutions and systems are rarely addressed. We want to suggest, however, that the BP has a dual character, and that different reasons for adopting a policy of encouraging staff mobility arise from each of the possible interpretations or understandings. On the one hand, the Bologna Process can be seen as a process of international socio-cultural and scientific exchange. On the other, as we have already suggested, it can be understood as an international process of labour market reform.

(a) Socio-Cultural Exchange

From the socio-cultural and scientific perspective, a degree of academic staff mobility is clearly desirable in itself, whether for individual members of staff or for the institutions and systems in which they work. It is evident from the existing BP documentation that all the parties to the process recognise the universal value of the exchange of different types of knowledge, interpretations of society, and pedagogical approaches. The argument that it is important to make this kind of exchange as easy as possible for staff and institutions alike needs no elaboration here. It is also important to bear in mind, however, that the academic profession is rooted in, and is a crucial contributor to national cultures. As Nunn puts it, education “is a process of re-learning the collective knowledge of society for each successive generation and learning from social and political mistakes. It is thus a core mechanism in cultural reproduction and historical social learning and development.” (Nunn 2005). The existence within national HE systems of distinctive cultural perspectives on particular areas of knowledge is precisely what gives mobility its value. There is a point at which the mobility of ideas and personnel reaches such a point that there is a danger of a cultural homogenisation that may undermine the goals of mobility - although this is clearly rather less of a risk for the natural sciences than it is for the humanities and social sciences. In any case, it should be borne in mind that from the socio-cultural perspective, the desirability of academic staff mobility is not without its limits

(b) Labour Market Reform

All this having been said, it seems fairly clear that the Bologna convergence is not being driven purely by the wish to realise the intrinsic benefits of staff mobility, but by the wish to proceed rapidly with labour market reform. Implied in the aims of the BP is a commitment to the principle of investing in and allocating human capital on a competitive
basis: The ‘supply’ of higher education should respond to the ‘demand’ for different types of labour and knowledge articulated in the labour market rather than to any social, political, cultural or administrative aims arising outside it (see, for example, Lambert and Butler 2006). It is one of the implied premises of the BP that European higher education institutions have no choice but to move towards a market-focused decision-making paradigm. This is entirely consistent with the observation in the HE management literature that institutional strategy is increasingly driven by the aim of responding to the market demand for particular types of educational provision and research rather than being guided by some socio-cultural definition of the appropriate areas of academic endeavour (Chevaillier 2000; Enders 2000; Savage 2004). There is also some empirical evidence supporting this claim. Research carried out in 2005 among certain of EU’s European affiliates found that “the most converging development in working conditions of staff in European higher education is the increasing demands made on academic staff to participate in commercial activities and commissioned research”(Gornitzka and Langfeldt 2005).

From this perspective, the BP can be interpreted as a process of labour market reform intended to contribute to the realization of a market-driven European HE system. It operates on two distinct but related levels. First of all, it aims to reorganize the supply side of the European market for highly skilled and educated labour. This is to be achieved via (a) the convergence of qualifications, credit transfer systems and quality assurance structures in higher education - to ensure that ‘consumers’ of HE can be confident that they are comparing similar products across different institutions - and (b) the internal reorganization of HEIs to ensure that decision-making is driven primarily by student and employer demand for different types of education and research. Second, and for our current purposes more importantly, the BP aims to liberalise one small but highly significant sector of this market, the market for academic labour. This is to be achieved via measures to make staff mobility within and between national HE systems easier. The assumption is that the European higher education system will be more efficient and more effective if institutions are free to try to recruit whichever staff they choose and if staff are free to offer their services to whichever institutions they choose. Hence the need for mobility.

While the two possible interpretations of the BP are certainly not incompatible, it is important to ensure that socio-cultural and economic/market reasons for particular policies and measures are not conflated. As we will see, there is a danger that the underlying market reasons for certain practices will be concealed beneath justification apparently emanating from socio-cultural concerns. For example, the use of insecure or temporary forms of employment, for which the real motive is the objective of providing teaching or research assistance as cheaply as possible, may be given a spurious justification by reference to the supposed benefits to the individual post-holder or the HE system in terms of training and experience.

One final point concerns the relationship between the mobility of researchers and the mobility of teachers and teacher-researchers. An impressive amount of time and energy has been expended within the European Union in formulating and implementing policies on the mobility of researchers. The motivation for this effort is entirely economic, the principal policy aim of mobility being “to make Europe the most dynamic and competitive knowledge economy in the world” (EC 2005b). This policy aim arises in turn from the EU’s Lisbon Strategy, which aims to improve European levels of productivity and growth via innovation and learning. While this economic motivation for mobility is in itself perfectly reasonable, care needs to be taken that the socio-cultural aims of HE - where the greater part of research takes place - are not ‘drowned out’ amid the clamour for research that has an obvious industrial or economic application. The situation is all the
more difficult because of the enormous overlap between the researcher and teacher/teacher-researcher career paths, particularly in their early stages when the three categories are virtually indistinguishable.

1.2 What Does ‘Staff Mobility’ Mean? The Institutional Types of Academic Mobility

One of the most important inconsistencies in the debate surrounding the BP is in the use of the term ‘staff mobility’ itself. In some cases it appears to refer to traditional types of academic exchange, in others to the recruitment of eminent foreign academics to permanent positions, and in yet others to the employment of early-career staff to fill junior research and teaching positions. In this section we will try to specify clearly the different meanings of staff mobility in terms of the relationship of an individual to the institution in which s/he is working.

In the context of the recently-agreed EU Lifelong Learning Programme - which among other functions will encompass the Erasmus Programme - ‘mobility’ is defined as “spending a period of time in another Member State, in order to undertake study, work experience, other learning or teaching activity or related administrative activity, supported as appropriate by preparatory or refresher courses in the host language or working language” (EU 2006). Reading between the lines of the policy discussion that has surrounded the BP, however, it becomes clear that this type of short-term, temporary mobility is not the only one that participants have in mind. The permanent or semi-permanent migration of academic staff to take up jobs in HE institutions outside their home country is also part of the picture.

In fact, the distinction between temporary mobility and indefinite mobility/migration is itself not entirely satisfactory. The literature on labour market mobility suggests that what is initially thought of as temporary migration has a tendency to become permanent, and that indefinite migrants frequently return home. We want to suggest that in the Bologna context it is more useful to draw a distinction on the basis of what we can call the ‘institutional anchoring’ that the staff member has in the destination country. On this basis we can identify four types of mobility, each of which has its own problems and associated policy issues:

- **Visits, exchanges and sabbaticals.** Mobility in which the member of staff maintains his or her contractual or institutional status in the home country. The Erasmus and Tempus schemes are perhaps the best examples of short-term mobility of this type, with the traditional sabbatical leave period an example of slightly longer term mobility. The funding for this kind of mobility can either come from the home institution or from an external body such as the EU or a charitable foundation.

- **Grants & fellowships.** Mobility in which the staff member has no remaining formal ties to his or her home country, but in which s/he does not have the status of an employee in the destination country. It is often the case, for example, that doctoral students are paid by their institution, but do not count as employees for tax or social security purposes. Postdoctoral researchers can also find themselves in this situation, although less frequently. In many cases, the funding for positions of this type is external.

- **Untenured/Insecure Employment.** Mobility in which a member of staff has no tenure, usually has a fixed term contract, and often has a post that is reliant on external funding.

- **Tenured/Secure Employment.** Mobility in which a member of staff has a regular contract of employment with the institution in the destination country, has tenured or
tenure-track status or its equivalent, and usually has a post funded from the regular budget.

Which of these types of institutional anchoring is chosen or is made available in any given case of mobility will depend on the reasons for which that mobility is undertaken or encouraged.

1.3 The Categories of Academic Mobility

The different reasons or justifications for mobility and the different institutional types of mobility interact to give rise to four categories of mobility, as shown in Table 1. The leftmost column shows the institutional types of mobility, while the top row indicates whether the emphasis in the justification of mobility in each case is on socio-cultural or market factors.

(a) Traditional Academic Exchange

The long-established tradition of academic visits, exchanges and sabbaticals remains perhaps the most important type of academic mobility. Although there is remarkably little data available on the extent of this kind of short-term mobility, it is nonetheless clear that it accounts for a great deal of movement. Traditional academic exchange is justifiable principally from the socio-cultural standpoint, permitting as it does the circulation of scientific knowledge, research techniques and pedagogical approaches. This is not to say that a market justification would be wholly implausible. Academic exchange allows the individual to engage in professional development and networking, representing an investment in human capital by the institution or HE system that is likely to bring returns in the form of innovation in teaching and research. However, the benefits of this type of mobility occur principally at the level of the HE systems of the sending and host countries. The immediate private benefit to the sending institution, which remains the employer, is relatively small and remains intangible. That this is the case is reflected in the justifications for traditional academic exchange to be found in the debate on mobility. The emphasis is very clearly placed on socio-cultural types of justification.

Indeed, too heavy an emphasis on market factors would almost certainly give rise to problems with this type of mobility, notably the uneven availability of funding. It may be the case that in overly ‘marketised’ systems, those disciplines and research areas that are in high demand are privileged in funding decisions at the expense of those that the market deems to be of lesser value. As we shall see, the availability of funding is the single most important factor influencing the extent of this type of mobility, and hence the risk to the opportunities available in certain sectors is potentially significant.

Perhaps even more significant a risk under this heading is that the opportunities for mobility will be unevenly distributed across national HE systems. Given that funding is the key factor, the less well-resourced systems within the BP may be unable to finance an appropriate degree of mobility without external assistance.
Table 1: The Categories of Academic Mobility

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<th>Socio-Cultural Emphasis</th>
<th>Market Emphasis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Visits, exchanges &amp;</td>
<td>Traditional Academic</td>
<td>Importing Cheap Academic Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sabbaticals</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Filling junior research &amp; teaching posts as cheaply as possible</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional (human capital) development and updating; construction of research and knowledge networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grants &amp; fellowships</td>
<td>Early Career Training &amp; Experience</td>
<td>Targeting the International Labour Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untenured/insecure</td>
<td>Doctoral or Postdoctoral research and/or teaching experience</td>
<td>Recruiting the best available candidate to a tenured academic post</td>
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<td>employment</td>
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<td>Tenured/secure employment</td>
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(b) Early Career Training and Experience/Importing Cheap Academic Labour

The danger of conflating socio-cultural and economic/labour market justifications for mobility is perhaps greatest in these two categories because the less secure forms of institutional anchoring are arguably appropriate in either case.

Going abroad to undertake doctoral research or to take up a postdoctoral research position is a very well-established practice that can easily be justified in terms of the increased potential for making a contribution to the development of knowledge that arises from exposure to a range of different cultures of learning and research. In the best of all possible worlds, it may also be the case that the recruitment of such junior staff from abroad meets a demand for certain skills that cannot be met in the domestic HE labour market. Recruiting postgraduate students or recently-qualified academic staff from abroad can be a perfectly rational and defensible course of action, particularly where staff subsequently return to their countries of origin with the additional knowledge and experience they have acquired in the course of their time abroad.

The question that arises is whether the types of short-term contract or fellowship frequently used in these cases are always justifiable. Too strong an emphasis on contingent resource streams in decision-making about employment may lead to the emergence of a segmented academic labour market, in the lower tier of which are concentrated “young researchers from abroad who are willing to comply with the unattractive terms and conditions even if natives do not” (EC 2006a). There is a danger that doctoral or postdoctoral researchers from abroad may be treated as a cheap source of teaching and research assistance. This danger is exacerbated where there are categories of staff with higher and lower status, for example tenured and untenured staff, or those with civil servant status and those without. The line between providing early career training and experience and simply seeking to lower labour costs by importing ‘cheap’ staff is an easy one to cross. Clearly, labour unions representing university teachers have a very important role to play here.

Depending on the career path chosen by the individual, this category of mobility shades into the more permanent forms of migration we discuss immediately below and in section 2. As Hansen and Soete (Hansen and Soete 2003) and Nunn (Nunn 2005), among others, point out, the evidence suggests that doctoral or post-doctoral studies abroad are a strong
predictor of a move into the permanent labour market in the host country. Clearly, some of this movement will be into the more stable part of the higher education sector.

(c) Targeting the International Labour Market

The final, least common category of mobility ought more strictly to be referred to as academic migration since it invariably involves the possibility of an indefinite stay abroad. The justification for recruiting from abroad is principally a market one. It is the interests of the individual institution or national HE system that motivate the recruitment of foreign staff. It may be thought to be necessary to recruit permanent staff from abroad as a consequence of a recruitment strategy that aims to appoint only the best available candidates, whatever their nationality or current geographical location, or because a sufficient number of adequate candidates cannot be found in the national labour market.

Arguably this is the least valuable form of mobility from the socio-cultural perspective, since on the assumption that the member of staff remains in post permanently, he or she has ceased to be mobile. Common sense - confirmed in this instance by empirical research carried out by Hansen (2003) and Gill (2005) - suggests that the longer foreign staff stay in post, the weaker become their connections with their home HE system. Not only is the distinctiveness of their disciplinary perspective likely to decline, the benefit of their expertise and experience is ultimately felt only in the destination country. Indeed, it could even be argued that this kind of permanent mobility is damaging to the general interest if the home HE system of the academic in question is significantly underdeveloped or underfunded relative to the host system. It is in these circumstances that the danger of ‘brain drain’ is most acute.

1.4 Summary

In this first section of the report we have attempted to introduce some clarity into the debate by discussing the different types of, and reasons for staff mobility. We suggested first of all that the mobility of academic staff can be justified on either socio-cultural or labour market grounds. In the former case, mobility is intended to benefit the HE system in both the 'sending' and 'receiving' countries via the exchange of knowledge, experience and practice. In the latter case, the needs of a single institution or HE system are privileged. We also suggested that it is more useful to categorise the different types of academic staff mobility according to their 'institutional anchoring' than the length of time a member of staff is away from his or her home country. We proposed four types of anchoring - visits, exchanges and sabbaticals; grants and fellowships; untenured employment; and tenured employment - and argued that in combination with our two justifications for mobility this gives rise to four categories of mobility: traditional academic exchange; early career training and experience; importing cheap academic labour; and targeting the international labour market.
2 Drain, Gain or Circulation? Applying the Literature on the Migration of Highly Skilled and Educated Labour to the Academic Case

As we have just seen, it is certainly not the case that all forms of academic staff mobility fall into the category of ‘migration’. However, we also saw that beyond the traditional forms of academic exchange, all staff mobility gives rise at least to the possibility of permanent migration. While the literature dealing specifically with academic staff migration is very limited, there is a substantial literature on the migration of highly skilled and educated individuals which is of obvious relevance to the case of HE. Most of this literature is anchored firmly in the policy debate, which is itself focused on the related questions of linking immigration policy to labour market demand for skills (host countries) and preventing or mitigating the effects of ‘brain drain’ (sending countries). There is a smaller literature on the experience of migrants, but that is of less immediate interest to us here. In this section we briefly discuss the findings of the relevant recent literature, and draw out the implications of our discussion for policy on academic migration.

2.1 Pro-migration Policies

Highly-skilled migrants, in contrast to those with no or low-level skills, are increasingly sought after in the world’s stronger economies. The demographic downturn in the developed world, as well as the increasing but as yet unexplained reluctance of young people in many countries to consider careers in science and technology (Avveduto and Brandi 2003; Hansen and Soete 2003; Kritz 2006) means that there is likely to be a general shortage of highly-qualified workers, as well as specific recruitment difficulties in high-technology sectors. There are two strategies that have been adopted in order to meet this demand, both of them tending towards what Kritz (2006) argues is essentially an open border regime for highly-skilled labour. The first is to attract already-qualified workers by introducing immigration quotas and ‘points schemes’ that aim to differentiate between potential immigrants on the basis of skill level. The second is what Abella (Abella 2006) has called the ‘academic gate’ approach, which is to say focusing in the first instance on attracting foreign students into the HE system, and making it easier for recently graduated students to remain in the country to seek work (Skeldon 2005; Kritz 2006; Kuptsch 2006; Suter and Jandl 2006). This second approach has considerable advantages for the recruiting countries, well beyond the revenue generated in the HE system. As Skeldon puts it, “developed countries are importing the raw material to train some of the human capital that they need. Foreign-born, the migrants are trained to the standards of the developed country and there is no resultant problem of accreditation and the recognition, or otherwise, of foreign qualifications. In effect, the developed country is generating ‘designer immigrants’” (Skeldon 2005).

As Nunn (2005) points out, it is not known with any certainty what proportion of migrants return home. However, the available empirical evidence suggests that the highly skilled are significantly more likely to stay on than the lower skilled, a finding that confirms the efficacy of the academic route to immigration. Nunn cites research by Meyer and Brown that found that only half of the foreign doctoral or post-doctoral students in the USA and France return home within two years (Meyer and Brown 1999).

‘Academic gate’ immigration policies are obviously of great significance for HE systems. Quite aside from the fact that, other things being equal, the more foreign students there are in the system, the more foreign candidates there will be for academic posts, individuals who have ‘been through the system’ benefit from the same local knowledge and networks that put home candidates at an advantage compared to those whose qualifications were earned abroad. The time spent studying for a degree is also time spent immersed in the language of the host country. In effect, by earning a first or postgraduate
degree in a particular HE system, individuals can avoid many of the informal obstacles that work against those who arrive with their higher education already completed.

2.2 Anti-Brain Drain Policies

The other major stream in the literature is concerned with the ‘brain drain’, which is to say the possibility that talented and highly qualified individuals will be enticed away from their home countries by the greater rewards and opportunities offered in bigger or more developed economies. The established argument is that this is a vicious circle: “Developing countries cannot stem the outflow of skills until they develop rapidly, but the loss of skills itself acts as a major constraint on growth” (Wickramasekara 2002). On the other hand, it has more recently been argued that the migration of highly-skilled individuals has benefits for the sending as well as the host countries. What we have, then, are optimistic and pessimistic views of migration: “The optimistic view is that increased flows of talented people will forge closer links between developing and developed countries, which will spur trade and investment, leading to convergence in economic performance and less migration over time. The pessimistic view is that the global quest for talent will be won by countries that are already prosperous, which will widen the economic gaps that spur migration, and turn some developing countries into ‘emigration nurseries’ that produce migrants for foreign jobs” (Kuptsch and Pang 2006). Wickramasekara offers a useful summary of the positive and negative effects of migration, which we have reproduced below as Table 2.

Few of the participants in the debate are willing to take a firm line on whether the migration of highly-skilled labour is in practice a good or a bad thing for the sending countries. This suggests that the balance of advantage is ultimately an empirical issue, depending on the particular political, economic and social context of the states in question. This is a conclusion that looks very plausible in the light of what is implied by Wickramasekara’s work, that is, that for each potentially positive effect there is a negative effect that might cancel it out. One widely-cited piece of work that does attempt to generalise, however, is Iredale’s 2001 piece on the mobility of the highly-skilled. She argues that the poorer the sending country, the more likely it is to be damaged by professional mobility. As we suggested above, a certain level of economic development is required before the theoretical advantages of student migration - and by implication the migration of highly-skilled labour - can be realised.

With respect to the policies that can be adopted to mitigate the actual or potential effects of the migration of highly-skilled labour, the consensus of opinion is summed up in a paper written for the International Migration Organisation by Lowell and Findlay (Lowell and Findlay 2001). Their ‘six Rs’ of migration policy (pp18-19) are as follows (there are actually seven policies, but two of these involve Retention):
### Table 2: Positive and Negative Effects of Migration of Highly-Skilled and Educated Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive effects</th>
<th>Negative effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provides rewarding opportunities to educated workers not available at home</td>
<td>Net decrease in human capital stock, especially those with valuable professional experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow of remittances and foreign exchange</td>
<td>Reduced growth and productivity because of the lower stock of human capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Induced stimulus to investment in domestic education and individual human capital investments</td>
<td>Fiscal loss of heavy investments in subsidized education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of skilled persons increases local human capital, transfer of skills and links to foreign networks</td>
<td>Remittances from skilled migration may taper off after some time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology transfer, investments and venture capital by diasporas</td>
<td>Reduced quality of essential services of health and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulation of brains promotes integration into global markets</td>
<td>Students educated at government expense or own resources in foreign countries imply further drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short term movements of service providers generate benefits for both receiving and sending countries</td>
<td>Opportunities for short-term movement of natural persons is seriously constrained by immigration policies of developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT allows countries to benefit from diasporas</td>
<td>Causes increasing disparities in incomes in country of origin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Wickramasekara 2002, p7.

**Return of migrants to their source country.** The return of emigrants is one sure way to cultivate human capital for source countries, especially when there is value added from working abroad.

**Restriction of international mobility.** Many developing countries have restrictive emigration policies that make it difficult for their nationals to take a job abroad. Almost all countries restrict the immigration of foreign nationals to protect their domestic workers from competition.

**Recruitment of international migrants.** If there are domestic shortages of skilled workers why not court foreign workers? New policies worldwide ease numerical and “protective” regulations on admissions.

**Reparation for loss of human capital (tax).** A favourite but never-implemented economic prescription in the 1970s, the idea is that developed countries either compensate source countries, or that emigrants pay taxes, to deal with externalities created by the immediate loss of human capital.

**Resourcing expatriates (diaspora options).** Skilled emigrants abroad can be a significant resource, especially if ongoing contact between academic and private sector institutions is
fostered. Government and private sector initiatives seek to increase communications, knowledge transfer, remittances, and investment.

**Retention through educational policies.** Creating a highly educated workforce begins with strengthening domestic educational institutions. A viable system encourages graduates to stay with the system, retains people and ensures that the source country keeps its original investment in education.

**Retention through economic development.** Giving people a reason to stay (or return) is doubtless the most effective policy for reducing emigration and the surest long-term means of boosting average human capital, as well as economic growth.

### 2.3 Policies on Academic Staff Migration

Very little has been written specifically about the migration of academic staff – the notable exception being Nunn’s 2005 paper - but it is a relatively straightforward matter to apply the lessons of more general work to the HE context. First of all there is the issue of opportunities for staff. As we have already noted, it is very clear from the existing research that one of the major motivations for HE staff who take up posts abroad is the availability of research resources, most especially in science and technology (OECD 2002; Avveduto and Brandi 2003; Hansen 2003; Gill 2005). The opportunity to take up a post where research resources are abundant is clearly a valuable one for staff in less well-resourced HE systems. Whether or not this ultimately has a negative effect on the sending country in terms of Wickramasekara’s ‘net decrease in capital stock’ depends on whether the member of staff returns to, or maintains close connections with their home HE system. In fact, the return of migrants or the maintenance of significant and regular contact between migrants and their home country is the crucial assumption underpinning most of the elements that go to make up the optimistic view of migration. The only element that would appear to be independent of these assumptions is the stimulus of increased investment in education and human capital formation in the home country.

The literature mentions at least two important factors that are likely to militate against both return and the persistence of diaspora networks in the academic context. The first is the fact that the skills and knowledge gained by the migrant may be of little use in their country of origin. As Gill puts it, “If the national science base of the sending country is not on a par with the host country, the returnee may bring back skills that he/she is unable to utilize and which will not necessarily secure the researcher work in the ‘home’ country” (2005; p322). The same point is made by Clark et al (2006) in relation to healthcare professionals. The second factor is that the longer a member of staff stays abroad, the weaker his or her connections with the home HE system become, and the more difficult reintegration is likely to be. This may be a matter of the decay of informal connections and networks of contacts, but may also be the result of a lack of recognition of periods abroad in terms of their intellectual value, calculations of seniority or career progression (Chevaillier 2000; Researchers 2001; Gill 2005).

It would seem, then, that we have a classic case of market failure. It cannot simply be assumed that the theoretical benefit to sending HE systems of the indefinite types of academic mobility will be realised in practice. Rather, policies need to be adopted to ensure that the benefits of knowledge transfer and participation in research networks arrive in sending HE systems, particularly if other, more market-inspired policies are to be put in place to facilitate the mobility of academic labour.

In this respect, a distinction drawn by some French researchers at the Centre de Sociologie des Organisations (CSO) is highly relevant (Dedieu 2002). In the course of reporting on the experience of foreign researchers working in both the public and private research sectors,
a distinction is drawn between two models of researcher mobility, the ‘market’ and ‘network’ models. In the former case, mobility arises from previously unconnected researchers and laboratories/research groups choosing to collaborate for market reasons, that is, certain limited and well-defined criteria relating to the each other’s performance or reputation. Well-qualified researchers will seek out the best laboratories in which to continue their careers by, for example, searching on the internet for citations of articles by the existing personnel of the lab. Similarly, the best-performing and best-resourced labs or research groups will try to recruit the best-qualified or most promising young researchers. The process of association is clear-eyed and independent of existing ties. The network model, on the other hand, relies on existing informal connections between researcher and research group, and puts less emphasis on the future consequences of association than on antecedent relationships and unquantifiable forms of reciprocity. Although he is cautious about the implications to be drawn from this finding, Dedieu reports that since an earlier research project carried out by the CSO in 1997, market forms of association seem to have become more important than those originating in networks.

At the same time, Dedieu argues that market and network models or types of mobility can be complementary, indeed may in some cases even be mutually dependent. For example, contact between individuals is frequently the means by which information about supply (candidatures) and demand (available posts) is transmitted. On the other hand, initially impersonal market forms of association may give rise to networks and hence to non-market forms of cooperation.

Finally, to return to the issue of market failure, Dedieu argues that for laboratories or research groups that do not enjoy a high international reputation - that are not ‘competitive’ in the labour market - the recourse to networks to find foreign researchers is often a substitute for participation in the game of supply and demand (p.92). All of this strongly suggests that it may be possible to use the creation or support of informal networks of academic staff to supplement or underpin market recruitment mechanisms.

It is interesting to note that Nunn’s recommendations about policies to address academic brain drain are directed towards the very similar idea that non-commercial forms of cooperation should be used to mitigate the effects of the market (Nunn 2005). In this respect he has four specific policy recommendations:

- Student and staff exchanges between universities should be carefully designed to ensure that knowledge and skills sharing is maximised.

- HEIs in the more advanced HE systems should be encouraged to allow the non-commercial licensing of teaching materials, and to develop non-commercial partnerships with HEIs in the developing world to facilitate exchanges and knowledge sharing.

- Joint research networks should be developed to allow researchers in the developing world access to research facilities. This would be a two-way exchange with HEIs benefiting from the skills and potential of researchers in the developing world without having to compete for their skills on an international market.

- Academic diaspora networks should be supported by promoting online registers of academics from the developing world working outside their home countries.

## 2.4 Summary

In this section of the report we have reviewed the literature on the migration of highly skilled and educated workers. We saw that there is a high level of interest in policies
concerned with the movement of highly skilled workers to the world’s more developed economies. These policies can be divided into those that seek to encourage migration, and those that seek to address the problems it potentially creates in ‘sending’ countries. We also saw that there appears to be no consensus on whether highly-skilled migration is in practice a benefit to sending countries. The theoretical case is ambiguous, and the evidence about mobility and its effects is insufficient to allow a balanced judgement to be made. Hence, whether migration results in a ‘brain drain’ must ultimately be treated as an empirical question. At the same time, the risks that migration carries for sending countries seem sufficiently real that the construction of an open-border regime for highly-skilled labour demands the introduction of policies to combat or mitigate the effects of brain drain. In general, these policies involve the encouragement of ‘brain circulation’ via the permanent or temporary return of migrants to their home countries, and providing active support for diaspora networks. In the specific case of higher education, the most fruitful policy direction would appear to be the development of non-commercial forms of research and teaching cooperation.
3 Obstacles to Academic Staff Mobility

All four of the Bologna Process statements of principle quoted above talk about the need to deal with obstacles to mobility, whether by ‘overcoming’, ‘removing’ or ‘lifting’ them. In effect, dealing with obstacles is the sole BP policy on staff mobility. However, as with mobility itself, what exactly counts as an obstacle and how it might be lifted, overcome or removed is not at all clear. In this section we will take a closer look at these questions with the aim of achieving greater clarity.

3.1 Categorizing Obstacles

Obstacles to mobility can be categorized according to the point in the process of migration that they intervene. Potential staff may be blocked or dissuaded from progressing at the point of (temporarily) leaving their existing employer or home country, at the point of entry to a different nation, at the point of qualification to enter the academic profession in that nation, at the point of forming a contract with an HEI or at the point of developing and progressing in a career, including further mobility or returning to their home system. Obstacles can also be considered from the perspective of the individual member of staff or the employing institution. Table 3 below gives some examples of certain obstacles to mobility from the individual and institutional perspectives. Some of the obstacles proposed apply only in the case of traditional academic exchange, others in the case of indefinite mobility and a small number in either case.

3.2 Obstacles, Regulation and Deregulation

In terms of removing the grosser obstacles to mobility, achievements to date at the supranational level – whether the BP itself or the EU – have certainly been impressive and seem to be largely uncontroversial. For example, the mutual recognition of qualifications, the diploma supplement, and the EU’s new ‘scientific visa’ all address obstacles to mobility that were increasingly difficult to justify. To deny a work permit to, or to refuse to appoint, an individual who has emerged via an open competition as the best candidate for a particular academic post for purely administrative reasons related to his or her nationality or the origin or comprehensibility of his or her qualifications is surely unjust.

Once we descend to the national or institution level, however, we are obliged to ask to what degree regulation that restricts the terms on which an individual may be employed can be considered an obstacle to mobility. For many HE managers – particularly those who look to the private sector for models of human resource management practice – obstacles to mobility include much more than formal regulation that prevents an appointment going ahead at all. Such managers might also see as an obstacle any external regulation that restricts the institution’s room for manoeuvre with respect to the qualifications required for a post, contractual issues like salaries, or the granting of tenured status - to name just a few of the potentially problematic areas. The requirement that candidates for certain positions have certain types of formal qualification unique to the HE system in question has historically been one of the most obvious and significant obstacles to mobility. This goes some way to explaining why it has been the target of significant attempts at reform like the dropping of the requirement for the ‘Habilitation’ in Germany. However, even apparently innocuous institutional factors like national-level
collective bargaining on salaries can be presented as problematic. Restrictions on the use of short-term contracts, for example, are arguably a disincentive to the creation of certain types of post that, again, might be attractive to candidates from nations with less-developed HE systems. Candidates may also be dissuaded from seeking work within HE systems in which career opportunities are limited by, for instance, restrictions on the number of senior or tenured staff. Similarly, nationally applicable minimum salaries can supposedly prevent the employment of teaching or research assistants, even though the potential occupants of these jobs are willing to accept a low salary (because it compares favourably with the remuneration they could expect in their home countries). Another argument often made is that national salary scales can prevent institutions from attracting top-level staff from other systems in which pay at the top of the scale is higher or unrestricted. Among HEI administrations and in the European Commission this appears to have become the unquestioned conventional wisdom. The European University Association’s 2005 ‘Trends’ survey, for example, reported without comment that “With
regard to staff recruitment and promotion, ... the impossibility for many institutions to introduce differentiated conditions and incentives in terms of staff salaries and other resources make the institutions less competitive on the international market” (Reichert and Tauch 2005).

3.3 Can we assume that removing obstacles is always a good thing?

While these kinds of policy arguments are now ubiquitous, it remains the case that in the more general debate on labour market reform, the straightforward equation between this kind of institution-level deregulation and positive outcomes for individuals, organisations and employment systems has been subject to trenchant criticism. There are two lines of critique, both of which centre around the extent to which market models are adequate representations of the dynamics of social interaction in the economic context. First of all, market models quite deliberately exclude the possibility that moral, political and ethical standards might have a significant effect on economic action. However, as Kaufman puts it, “real people... judge economic transactions by not only price but also fairness, and transactions that are deemed unfair lead to predictable negative consequences such as quitting, holding back work effort, striking...” (Kaufman 2004). Returning to our earlier example of national salary scales, it may well be the case that these are seen by employees as an expression of equity and solidarity - of the uniform value of academic work, regardless of subject or institutional context - as well as a guarantee against arbitrary treatment. Hence, although the ‘flexibilisation’ of pay via the abandonment of national-level pay may increase institutional freedom to recruit, and hence increase managers’ control over the internal configuration of an institution, it may also have a negative effect on institutional performance via staff resentment and resistance arising because of its perceived unfairness.

The second line of critique remains more squarely within the discipline of economics. Basic economic models assume that there are no barriers to competition, and in particular no barriers to entry to the market. However, as we have seen in some detail in this report, it is very clearly the case that certain institutions and HE systems within the Bologna area are, for historical and political reasons, at an enormous advantage when it comes to competing for students, staff and research funding, and others are at such a disadvantage that in effect they are excluded from meaningful participation in these markets. These distortions in the market for HE seem likely to mean that without some kind of rational re-regulation, removing obstacles to mobility will have some distinctly negative effects for many institutions and systems, the ‘brain drain’ from East to West being only the most frequently cited.

3.4 Socio-culturally Justifiable Obstacles

These thoughts on the potentially negative effects of deregulation even from within the ‘market-managerialist’ perspective can be complemented by certain arguments constructed from the socio-cultural perspective on HE. The ‘marketisation’ of HE carries the risk that HEIs will no longer be able to carry out their ‘cultural and social mission’. In what is only the most recent statement of its type, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) concluded that “The traditional vocation and full potential of universities for the 21st century include, besides independent inquiry and free advancement of acquired knowledge (but also through these activities) steady contributions to developing social order and a sense of basic values in societies, cultivation of national identity as well as an open-minded understanding of international and universal merits, promotion of democratic citizenship and sensitivity to human and natural environment both locally and globally, setting of academic objectives, training for practical flexibility as well as teaching in critical thinking” (PACE 2006).
It is crucial to ensure that the convergence of HE structures in Europe does not also lead to a homogenisation of the existing national cultures of knowledge and pedagogy, particularly if the characteristics of a homogenised culture are to be determined by the market rather than in conscious and deliberate processes of identity-formation. One of the most obvious threats in this respect is the increasing pressure on HEIs and academic staff to provide teaching in one of the two or three ‘international’ languages, notably English. On the other side of this particular coin, it could also easily be argued that systems and institutions should drop formal requirements for competence in national languages since such requirements clearly represent obstacles to mobility. For example, in France, participants in the competition that qualifies individuals to hold ‘tenured’ posts in the field of management studies are significantly marked down if the work they submit for evaluation omits any reference to the major works in French in their field. They are also required to provide a full translation of their published works - including their doctoral thesis - into French. Just to give another example, qualifying in the field of history and civilisation requires a 15-page resumé of the thesis in French, and at least one French publication. Now, these requirements undoubtedly represent serious obstacles to the accession of foreign candidates to academic positions in French universities. Nevertheless, from the perspective of French language and culture it is arguably very important to ensure that candidates for academic posts have a basic familiarity with the francophone canon in their field, all the more so in those areas like business and management that are dominated by ‘anglo-saxon’ thinking. It is also wholly unreasonable to expect that assessors should in all cases be familiar with a candidate’s language. While the precise nature of the linguistic and cultural requirements in question ought to be open to discussion - language requirements might be made post hoc rather than ad hoc, for example, or financial assistance could be offered to candidates for translation costs - it is surely difficult to argue that national HE systems should not have the right to make demands of this kind on candidates even though certain otherwise qualified individuals would thereby be excluded.

3.5 Summary

In this third section of the report we have considered the question of obstacles to staff mobility. We suggested that such obstacles can be categorized according to the point in the process of mobility at which they have their obstructive effect; and according to whether the perspective of the individual or the HE institution is adopted. We then argued that great care needs to be taken in the definition of obstacles. What can appear from one perspective as a bureaucratic obstruction to staff recruitment can from a different standpoint appear as an entirely reasonable piece of employment regulation designed to prevent exploitation and to maintain salaries and working conditions at an acceptable level. We cited some theoretical arguments that suggest that this difference in perception has parallels in the academic literature on labour markets. There is a strong current in the academic debate that rejects the neoliberal assumption that deregulation is necessarily a good thing. Hence, removing obstacles to mobility must not be conflated with the simple deregulation of the academic labour market. Finally, we argued that certain obstacles to mobility are justifiable from the socio-cultural perspective. We proposed that HE systems and institutions have a right to protect national and regional cultures of knowledge and learning, and to take steps to avoid cultural homogenisation.
A Statistical Picture of the European Higher Education Area

The 46 member states of the Bologna Process are extraordinarily diverse - far more so even than the member states of the EU - even considering only the crudest economic and statistical indicators. They range in population from less than 1000 individuals to over 140 million, in the number of public HE institutions from one to over 1200, and in student numbers from 330 to more than 8.5 million. In 2004, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, expressed in purchasing power parity terms, ranged from less than US$2,200 to more than US$40,000. Seven of the top ten world economies ranked by GDP per capita were members of the BP, but one participating state came in 136th out of the 181 world economies, and another five were to be found below 100th place.

Clearly, then, the basic financial capacity of different member states to invest in higher education is enormously variable. As well as this immense spread of quantitative factors, however, there are also very significant differences in social and political culture and in the systems and structures of education in the different states. Perhaps most importantly, there is great variation in the capacity of the government apparatus to make decisions that reflect the democratically-expressed will of the people and to implement them effectively. The variation in financial and governance capacity in turn implies that the capacity of national HE systems and individual institutions to attract and retain staff, whether on a temporary or a permanent basis, is also enormously variable.

4.1 Categorising the Bologna Countries

In order to make some sense of this picture we can identify four groups of BP members on the basis of a combination of economic and political indicators that, taken together, give a very rough indication of the ability of participating states to organise and finance a stable and effective HE system that is likely to be attractive to mobile staff and students. This should enable us to make some observations about the likely future pattern of academic migration flows based on the potential for the development of HE systems. Certainly, it would have been possible simply to categorise member states by reference to their relationship to the EU - date of accession to membership, membership of the EEA, candidature for membership etc. - but this would have been to overlook, for example, the fact that the weaker economies among the pre-2004 membership of the EU share certain important characteristics with the stronger of the post-2004 members.

In order to arrive at the ranking that underpins our 4-way categorisation, we took the 2004 figure for GDP per capita, and weighted it according to the average of a series of six quantitative indicators of the quality of democratic governance developed by researchers at the World Bank. Thus, relatively poor economic performance can be compensated for by high quality governance and vice versa. Certainly, there is a broad correlation between GDP per capita and performance in terms of the governance indicators, but the weighting does make a significant difference to the ranking. For example, despite having a GDP per capita which is 20% higher than that of Bulgaria, Russia ranks lower in the weighted list as a result of its relatively poor governance score. The same is true of Greece, which ranks below Portugal in our politico-economic ranking despite a 12% advantage in GDP per capita.

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2 Figures from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook. Gross domestic product is “the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time” (Wikipedia). It is defined as the total of consumption plus investment plus government spending plus exports less imports. We have used GDP figures expressed in purchasing power parity terms, which is to say that the different currencies are converted to dollars not on the basis of market exchange rates but rates that “equalize the purchasing power of different currencies in their home countries for a given basket of goods” (Wikipedia).

3 The indicators are: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. See Kaufman et al 2006.
capita. We should emphasise, however, that this ranking is intended purely to permit a non-arbitrary division of the BP member states into a small number of groups for the purposes of statistical comparisons. We make no claims for its scientific validity beyond this simple purpose.

Table 4: Bologna Process Members

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<th>Zone A</th>
<th>Zone B</th>
<th>Zone C</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Given that eligibility for membership of the EU is a question of economic performance and political stability, it is not surprising that the ranking does in fact closely reflect the member states’ historic relationship with the EU and their location in ‘western’ or ‘eastern’ Europe. What we will call Zone A consists of thirteen out of the fifteen pre-2004 members of the EU (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK), together with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. Zone B consists of Portugal, Greece, the twelve post-2004 members of the EU (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) and Croatia, likely to accede to EU membership by 2010. Zone C consists of the two other current EU candidate countries (Turkey and Macedonia), three of the four Balkan states that have formally been recognised as potential EU candidates (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia) and four former Soviet Socialist Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova). According to our ranking, the Russian Federation and Ukraine ought to be included in Zone C. However, for historical reasons the HE systems of these two states are very different to those in the other countries of Zone C, particularly in terms of the participation rate and indeed the sheer scale of the systems. For this reason we have decided to list these two states separately as Zone D. The four remaining member states (Andorra, the Holy See, Liechtenstein and Montenegro) have been excluded from the ranking simply on the grounds of the lack of availability of data. The three micro-states rarely figure in the available datasets, and Montenegro has too recently gained its independence for disaggregated data to be available. In fact, in the statistics that follow, we have been obliged to treat Serbia and Montenegro as if they were still a single state.

4.2 Demography and Economic Performance

While it would be of little value to engage in a detailed assessment of the future prospects for population and economic growth, it is worth taking note of two sets of general trends that are of relevance to HE. The first is the decline in the initial HE-age population, and the second the disparities in growth rates between our four groups of countries.
(a) **Demographic Change**

In the period to 2020, as is well known, the university-age population all across Europe is expected to decline. In 2020 there will be almost 13 million fewer 20-24 year olds in the Bologna Area than in 2005, a fall of over 20%. Zone C is expected to experience the slowest decline in the population of young people, although this is principally due to the influence of population growth in Turkey. The steepest decline will be in Zones B and D. Figure 1 illustrates the impending changes in the projected 20-24 year old population in the different zones.

![Figure 1: Change in 20-24 Year Old Population](image)

Source: author's calculations based on statistics from the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

(b) **Economic Growth**

We can use International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics and projections for GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity terms) as a measure of the rate of economic growth. The projected GDP per capita figures for 2007 are shown in Figure 2.
However, Zones B, C and D have a considerably higher average rate of growth than Zone A. As can be seen from Figure 3, it is Russia and Ukraine that are growing the fastest, with an average rate of GDP growth between 2003 and 2007 of almost 9%. The average growth in Zone C is 7.9%, in Zone B 6.5% and in Zone A 3.9%. If we assume that these average growth rates are maintained - not an entirely reasonable assumption, as growth tends to slow as economies mature, but an interesting heuristic device nevertheless - then Zone D will ‘catch up’ with Zone A by 2029, Zone B by 2034 and Zone C by 2045.
4.3 Participation in HE and Trends in Student and Staff Numbers

We have used UNESCO figures on enrolment in tertiary education and ‘school age’ population to calculate comparable figures on HE student numbers, students by subject, number of foreign students in each system, participation rates, staff numbers and student:staff ratios.

(a) Student Numbers

According to UNESCO, there were 32.3 million full- and part-time HE students at all levels in the Bologna area in 2004. Of these, 40.2% were studying in institutions in our Zone A countries, 17% in the countries of Zone B, 8.6% in Zone C and 34.3% in Zone D (see Figure 4). Figure 5 shows, the rate of increase in student numbers, which in recent years has been significantly higher outside Zone A. Figures for the Russian Federation were not available.

![Figure 4: Total Number of HE Students in the Bologna Area 2004](image)

Source: author’s calculations based on statistics from UNESCO Institute for Statistics

(b) Subject of Study

Among students in the states for which UNESCO was able to provide a subject breakdown, 2.5% were studying agriculture, 3.7% services, 9.5% science, 9.6% education, 10.4% health and welfare, 11.2% humanities and arts, 15.5% engineering and construction, and 35.7% social sciences, business and law. As can be seen from Table 5, in the countries of Zone A, the proportion of students studying arts and humanities, science, and health and welfare were significantly higher than in Zones B, C and D. By contrast, the proportion of students in Zones B, C and D studying services and social science, business and law was significantly higher than in Zone A.

The eight subject areas are those defined in the UNESCO International Standard Classification of Education (UNESCO 2006). The subject areas are more or less self-explanatory except for ‘services’, which includes personal services, e.g. catering or tourism, transport services, environmental protection and security services. Figures were not available for Albania, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, France, the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Serbia and Montenegro.
Table 5: Student Enrolment by Subject 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISCED Subject Classification</th>
<th>Zone A</th>
<th>Zone B</th>
<th>Zone C plus Ukraine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities and Arts</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences, Business and Law</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Welfare</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s calculations based on statistics from UNESCO Institute for Statistics

(c) Foreign Student Numbers

In the UNESCO statistics for each education system is a figure for the ‘inbound mobility rate’, which is to say the percentage of students in tertiary education who are studying outside their home country. Having calculated comparable figures for each of our four zones, we can plot the evolution of foreign student participation between 1999 and 2004, as shown in Figure 6. It hardly needs to be stated that the Zone A countries have a considerably higher proportion of foreign students in their HE systems, and that the recent rate of increase of foreign student numbers has been very much greater there. We should note that comparable figures for Russia were not available for the whole period under examination.
Figure 6: Proportion of Foreign HE Students (UNESCO Inbound Mobility Rate)

Source: author’s calculations based on statistics from UNESCO Institute for Statistics

(d) **Participation Rate**
The HE participation rate has been calculated as the total student enrolment at ISCED level 5A - roughly equivalent to bachelors level - expressed as a percentage of the age-relevant population. Figure 7 shows the recent trend in participation rates in Zones A, B and C. Ukraine and Russia have been shown separately as data for Russia is only available for 2003 and 2004. As can be seen in Figure 7, the trend towards increased participation has been strongest in the countries of Zones B and D. Presuming the existing trends have continued, it is reasonable to assume that average participation rates are now more or less the same - around 50% - in Zones A, B and D. The other notable feature is the participation rate in Zone C, which at just over 21% is very significantly lower than that of the other zones. Participation is also increasing more slowly in Zone C.

(e) **Student:Staff Ratios**
We can use the UNESCO statistics to calculate the number of HE students (at all levels, both full and part time) per member of teaching staff (again, both full and part-time). In 2004 this ranged from less than 7 in Germany to more than 25 in Albania. Figure 8 shows the change in these student:staff ratios (SSR) between 1999 and 2004. The rapid increase in the SSR in Zone B is consistent with the rapid increase in participation illustrated in Figure 7.
4.4 Existing Patterns of Academic Mobility

Very little hard information is available on this subject. Any kind of statistics on staff mobility are difficult to come by, let alone information that would permit cross-national comparisons. The basic problem is that national data collection systems tend to focus on those individuals who are currently ‘in the system’, and are unconcerned with where they were before they came into it and where they go when they leave it. Methodological
innovation and a willingness to make imaginative use of the available information sources\(^5\) can only partially compensate for the absence of dedicated data collection. The small amount of research evidence that does exist concentrates on the mobility of researchers rather than the teachers and teacher-researchers who are our primary concern here. One likely reason for this imbalance is the imbalance in mobility itself, mobility for teaching purposes being much less common than mobility for research.

(a) Traditional Academic Exchange

While it is clearly the most common category of staff mobility, traditional academic exchange (as defined in section 1) remains the least-reported and least-monitored. For this reason we have found it impossible to judge its extent - this would require a major international survey - and neither is it apparent whether there are any serious inconsistencies in the availability of opportunities to engage in it. There are a very limited number of facts to hand, however. We know that in 2005 the TEMPUS programme - an EU scheme to support cooperation between HE institutions in the EU and those in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia - allocated 120 individual mobility grants to staff from Bologna Process member states. Of these, 70% were for retraining and study periods, 18% for preparatory activities for TEMPUS-funded joint projects and the remaining 12% for participation in conferences and seminars. Rather more usefully, we also know the extent and breakdown by country of the EU’s ERASMUS Teacher Mobility programme, which in the academic year 2004/2005 enabled 20,877 staff to depart on visits of an average of 6-7 days.\(^6\) We can treat this as representing a kind of sample of the whole population of traditional academic exchanges, although we should be wary that the distribution of grants reflects not just the pattern of ‘spontaneous’ cooperation between academic staff in different countries but also the powerful influence of the European Commission. Nevertheless, looking at the distribution of grantholders by country of origin and destination gives us at some idea of the more general picture.

The statistics suggest that there is a slightly greater tendency for staff from our Zone B countries (in this case also including Turkey) to engage in teaching exchange. 34.4% of grantholders (outgoing staff) were from Zone B countries, whereas only 30.7% of the total number of staff in the participating states work in the Zone B HE systems. The overall distribution of host institutions, on the other hand, was not significantly different from the distribution of staff. 70.1% of grantholders were hosted by institutions in Zone A, while 69.3% of staff worked in HEIs in Zone A. Perhaps not surprisingly, Zone B grantholders showed a greater tendency to seek exchange destinations in Zone A. Almost 80% of Zone B participating staff visited a destination institution in a Zone A country, as opposed to 65% of grantholders from Zone A.

We can rank the HE systems participating in the Erasmus teacher exchange programme according to the propensity of staff to move, and also according to the propensity of HEIs to host grantholders. These propensities can be measured simply by the ratio of each country’s percentage share of grantholders departing or grantholders hosted to the country’s percentage share of the total number of staff across all the participating HE systems. Where the number of grantholders originating in an HE system as proportion of the total number grantholders across all systems is the same as the total number of staff in that system as a proportion of the total number of staff in all systems, then this ratio will be 1. A ratio higher than 1 indicates a greater than average propensity to undertake an academic visit or to host visiting staff.

\(^5\) See, for example, Gurney and Adams (2005), who use information on the citation of academic articles to track the careers of certain academics.

The top 10 member states in terms of propensity to move and propensity to host are shown in Table 6. The top 10 in terms of absolute numbers of staff sent or hosted are shown in Table 7. The figures suggest that the ‘prize’ for participation in the Erasmus teacher mobility programme should go to Finland, closely followed by the Czech Republic.

Table 6: Top 10 Erasmus Teacher Mobility Movers and Hosts by Propensity to Undertake or Host Visits 2004/5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 10 Movers</th>
<th>Top 10 Hosts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s calculations based on EC and UNESCO Figures

Table 7: Top 10 Erasmus Teacher Mobility Movers and Hosts by Absolute Numbers of Visits Undertaken or Hosted 2004/5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 10 Movers</th>
<th>Top 10 Hosts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EC

(b) **Indefinite Migration**

There is slightly more information available about the indefinite than the strictly temporary forms of mobility/migration, but this is not to say that it amounts to a great deal. We should note here that we describe the categories of staff mobility other than traditional academic exchange as ‘indefinite’ and treat them as a single category because, given that in all cases the member of staff retains no institutional anchoring in his or her home HE system, there is no guarantee that s/he will return to it, even in the very common case of an initial engagement in the host institution of a limited duration. In any case, in many of the Bologna countries the indefinite forms of mobility are next to
impossible to distinguish from each other in statistical terms and must of necessity be
treated together.

Evidence from the UK
We can begin by looking at the case of the UK, an interesting example as it is widely
recognised to have the most open and transparent recruitment system of any European HE
system. UK HEIs also appear to have the greatest autonomy in recruitment, with the
majority of decisions about new appointments being made at faculty level. Generally
speaking, no reference even to any institution-level machinery is required, still less any
supra-institutional authority. The information that we have about the migration of staff in
the UK HE system comes from a series of studies carried out by or on behalf of the Higher
Education Policy Institute (HEPI) (Bekhradnia and Sastry 2005; Gurney and Adams 2005;
Sastry 2005).

The first and perhaps most important finding is that over the period from 1995/6 to
2002/3, between 60 and 70% of staff who entered or left the UK to take up academic
positions were researchers. This is a category of staff who in the UK are in the main
relatively junior, and employed on fixed-term contracts funded from research grant
income. Some of this movement was accounted for by UK nationals, and so around “half of
all migrations in both directions are accounted for by non-UK nationals on research
grades.”(Bekhradnia and Sastry 2005). Sastry comments that “of particular interest are
the numbers of foreign nationals amongst emigrants. In the context of overall net
immigration, these figures suggest that many of those who leave the UK have previously
entered the country in order to take up academic posts” (Sastry 2005; para 8).

The number of migrants in established, permanent academic posts was, obviously,
considerably lower. Bekhradnia and Sastry estimate that the emigration rate among senior
staff was under one percent. The immigration rate was slightly higher and showed more
fluctuation, something that the authors suggest may be because of peaks in recruitment
activity connected to the UK’s research assessment cycle.

Immigration to the UK was concentrated in research-led institutions. Sastry (2005) reports
that in 2002/3, just four institutions were responsible for employing 31 percent of
immigrants, and 12 for recruiting 50% (para 12). He also reports that a disproportionate
number of migrants in both directions specialised in the biological, mathematical and
physical sciences. 37% of immigrants and 41% of emigrants worked in these disciplines as
compared to only 19% of staff in the UK academic workforce as a whole. Given the high
proportion of researchers among migrants, and the high level of grant funding associated
with these disciplines, Sastry suggests that this finding is not surprising.

The other highly relevant finding from this project is that over the period studied, the
number of immigrants to the UK HE system from the (pre-enlargement) EU grew by 20%,
while immigrants from the USA fell by 16%. Bekhradnia and Sastry conclude that “There
may be some evidence that researchers from European countries are beginning to treat
the UK as UK researchers regard the USA, coming here to begin their career and establish
their reputations, and then returning to their home countries to continue their
careers.”(2005; para 33).

Evidence from the rest of Europe
A less reliable but nonetheless interesting part of the HEPI project also sheds a little light
on the situation outside the UK as well as within it. Gurney and Adams’ work on tracking
highly-cited researchers in the natural sciences was based on cross-referencing citation
data with biographical information to track the careers of individual academics. However,
apart from the UK, the sample sizes were very small, and the data reported in the work is
rather difficult to interpret. Furthermore, as the authors themselves concede, it cannot be taken as given that the mobility patterns of highly-cited researchers are representative of those of the academic population as a whole.

This having been said, the authors’ own conclusions about mobility in Europe are worth repeating. These are that there are “diverse patterns of mobility ranging from the Swiss, who appear to be extremely mobile, to the French, who are the least mobile. Over 90% of highly cited researchers currently based in Switzerland have had some research training or employment in another country. In addition, most of these researchers were not born in Switzerland though they are predominantly European. Conversely, highly cited researchers based in France, typically, were born there, were awarded a higher degree from a French institution, did postdoctoral research there and have not held tenured research posts elsewhere. The mobility of Italian highly cited researchers is similarly low though less extreme” (Gurney and Adams 2005).

Table 8: Patterns of Highly-Cited Scientific Researcher Mobility in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of highly-cited researchers born in this country and working elsewhere</th>
<th>% of highly-cited researchers working in this country and born elsewhere</th>
<th>% of highly-cited researchers with any non-home work experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Gurney and Adams 2005, Tables 3.2 and 3.6

Evidence from the European University Institute

Finally, moving from the unreliable to the virtually anecdotal, we can cite a study of graduate destinations carried out by the Social and Political Sciences (SPS) Department of the European University Institute, a social sciences and humanities research institution associated with the EU. The department identified 180 of its PhD graduates who were known to be working in academic jobs. Of these, 32% (58) were employed outside their country of origin. Figure 9 shows the distribution of these 58 graduates by the country in which they are currently working.
The interest of these figures is both in what they suggest about academic mobility beyond the natural sciences, and in the obvious concentration of migration choices in one particular HE system, that of the UK. There are several factors that may be involved here. First of all, although the EUI is in principle a multi-lingual institution, in practice the lingua franca of the SPS department is English. Hence, all graduates will have arrived with a good level of English, and will have had at least three years to improve it further. Second, as we noted above, there is the relative accessibility of academic posts in the UK. Finally, it may be the case that the ‘anglo-saxon’ disciplinary orientation of the Department - a concentration on empirical research methods rather than on philosophical or theoretical issues - also has something to do with the choice of destination. It is obviously very difficult to judge whether the absence of a language barrier or the relative accessibility of the HE system are the more important factors here. However, we can certainly treat these figures as evidence that the relative absence of formal and informal barriers to entry, as well as the fact that it is home to the world’s most widely spoken second language does give the UK HE system a significant advantage in recruitment.

4.5 Summary
This section has been devoted to providing a statistical overview of the basic economic and demographic characteristics of the Bologna process members, as well as some information about their HE systems and, to the very limited extent that this is possible, the existing patterns of academic mobility within the Bologna area. The BP members were organised into four (geographically non-contiguous) zones, according to certain of their economic and political characteristics. We were able to show that demographic change is likely to be uneven across the EHEA - although a decline in the university-age population is almost universal - and that the existing differences in economic performance will persist for some time. With respect to HE systems, we saw that the rate of increase in student numbers has been faster outside Zone A than within it. Perhaps not surprisingly, a considerably higher proportion of students in these wealthier states are enrolled on courses in science and health than in the other participating HE systems. We saw that the participation of foreign students is only of any real significance in the HE systems of Zone A, where it has recently also been rapidly increasing. Overall participation in initial HE has been increasing almost everywhere, and in most participating states is nearing 50%.
However, the average participation rate is closer to 21% in Zone C, the poorest group of states. The average number of students per member of teaching staff - the student:staff ratio - has been declining in the Zone A states, but increasing almost everywhere else. From the limited information that is available, it appears that young researchers are the most mobile category of staff, that the ‘hard’ sciences account for a greater proportion of mobile staff than their presence in the population as a whole, and that well-resourced institutions are responsible for the greater part of foreign staff recruitment. Temporary mobility for teaching purposes is clearly less ‘market-driven’, with no obvious distinction between the better- and less-well-resourced HE systems in terms of their propensity to participate in exchange. Finally, data on graduates of the European University Institute shows that the UK is by some way the most popular destination for those seeking permanent academic posts outside their home country.
The Future Pattern and Effect of Academic Staff Mobility

It should by now be clear that the information on which any predictions about the future patterns and effects of staff mobility has to be premised is rather thin. Nevertheless, we can still identify certain tendencies that seem likely to have an effect on the pressures that prompt individuals to move, whether temporarily or indefinitely. According the model of indefinite migration we propose below, how these pressures translate into actual migratory flows will depend on the obstacles and incentives that exist. The effect of these migratory flows will in turn depend on the degree to which other policy instruments can be developed to supplement and balance the market mechanisms of supply and demand for labour. With respect to the strictly temporary forms of mobility that we have called traditional academic exchange, the situation is rather more straightforward. The evidence suggests that the key factors are funding, teaching cover and recognition of the professional value of mobility, the last of these being particularly relevant in the case of mobility undertaken for teaching purposes.

Through all of the discussion that follows it is important to bear in mind that there is a limit to the mobility of academic labour. It could never become perfectly mobile even if every formal and informal obstacle was definitively removed. Unlike the competences of, say, health professionals, academic skills and knowledge are not necessarily transferable. Perhaps more accurately, they are not necessarily marketable outside a national context. This is particularly the case for teaching and research in the social sciences and humanities, where in-depth knowledge of national and regional characteristics and cultures are common elements of academic competence. Another particularity of academic work outside the natural sciences and technology is the crucial importance of language as a medium for communicating complex ideas that cannot be conveyed in symbolic terms. While an adequate understanding of foreign languages is relatively easy to acquire, few individuals are capable of writing competently at an advanced level in a language that is not their mother tongue.

5.1 A Theoretical Model of Indefinite Migration

The conventional theoretical framework for understanding the genesis of migratory flows consists of identifying labour supply and/or ‘push’ factors and labour demand and/or ‘pull’ factors. The proposal is that migratory flows will arise as a consequence of the interaction between those factors that can motivate an individual to leave his or her home country, and those that act as a positive incentive to move to a particular destination.

We also have to take into account the effect of informal or legal/administrative obstacles to migration, as well as allowing for the existence of positive incentives to move to a particular country, put in place as part of a strategy to attract migrants. Figure 10 illustrates the model of migration that results from these additions. The assumption is that obstacles or incentives intervene between supply/push and demand/pull factors to either prevent or promote a successful transition to the new country. Obstacles and incentives thus change the scale of any migratory flows that would occur ‘naturally’, that is, if labour were to be perfectly mobile and government intervention - whether in favour of or against migration - entirely absent.

(a) Supply/Push and Demand/Pull

These factors need a little disentangling. On the one hand, we need to recognise the role of labour market supply and demand. The potential pool of migrants in the case of highly skilled migration depends on the pool of qualified candidates. Likewise the possibility of migrating depends on there being demand in the putative host country that cannot be met from the domestic market and that is expressed in offers of employment that are
sufficiently attractive to draw in candidates from abroad. On the other hand, the notion of ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors is wider than that of supply and demand. It permits the inclusion of non-economic drivers of migration.

Figure 10: A Simple Theoretical Model of Indefinite Migration

Regardless of whether they are economic or non-economic in origin, supply/push factors give rise to a pool of potential migrants, while demand/pull factors explain where they decide to go. In many cases of course, push and pull factors are simply the two faces of a single coin, like low pay (push) vs high pay (pull) or political instability (push) vs political stability (pull). Clark and his colleagues (Clark, Stewart et al. 2006), writing about healthcare professionals, propose a list of seven economic and non-economic factors that can both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ migrants. These are set out below as Table 9.

This list of factors is obviously also applicable to higher education staff, although one might plausibly specify under the heading of ‘working conditions’ the state of the public research base. The literature make it clear that the career decisions of HE staff are particularly sensitive to the research resources to which they have access (OECD 2002; Hansen 2003; Ackers 2005).
Table 9: Push and Pull Factors in the Migration of Health-Care Professionals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Push Factors</th>
<th>Pull Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate compensation</td>
<td>Better Compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions/job dissatisfaction</td>
<td>Better working conditions/greater job satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work-related hazards</td>
<td>Safer work environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of career opportunities</td>
<td>Greater career opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor quality of life</td>
<td>Better quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability/war/ethnic conflict</td>
<td>Political stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of opportunities (educational etc.) for children</td>
<td>Greater opportunities for children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Obstacles and Incentives
Obstacles to mobility were discussed in Section 3. Here we need simply note that positive incentives to mobility go beyond simply removing or otherwise addressing obstacles. Rather, they are intended as a specific incentive to staff to seek a position or an exchange in a particular country. Although these types of incentive do exist - the concessionary rate of income tax granted to foreign researchers in Denmark, for example, or the substantial funding for academic exchanges with institutions in Germany provided by DAAD, the German Academic Exchange Service - they are currently of little importance in European higher education. This is not to say, however, that they will not become more significant factors in the future, particularly if competition in the academic labour market intensifies.

5.2 Supply/Push and Demand/Pull Factors Affecting Indefinite Migration
The availability of funding and the demand for HE are the two factors that will have the most significant effect on overall demand for academic staff. The better-funded the HE system, the easier it is to ensure that pay and, notably, working conditions and research facilities do not remain as emigration ‘push’ factors. The greater the demand for HE, obviously enough, the greater the number of staff that are required if that demand is to be satisfied.

(a) Economic Development
The greater part of the existing research on the migration of highly skilled labour is about the drain of brains from ‘developing’ economies, particularly from Africa. Most of these economies are both exceptionally poor and show little prospect of rapid development. In the case of the Bologna area, however, the ‘gap’ between the sending and host economies is in most cases not unbridgeable. There is also every reason to be optimistic about the prospects for economic development in the Bologna countries outside Zone A. This is particularly true with respect to Zone B, the majority of countries in which are recent members of the EU. As Chammartin and Cantu-Bazaldua argue with respect the EU’s newest member states, “The same trends observed during the Southern enlargements of the European Union are starting to develop, including a massive inflow of FDI [foreign direct investment] and an increasing International trade. These, in addition to the structural and cohesions funds assigned by the EU, will generate significant economic growth, with a consequent improvement of the employment situation, and will slowly push to convergence with the other members” (Chammartin and Cantu-Bazaldua 2004). Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that even with the very high rates of growth that are the norm outside Zone A, economic convergence across the Bologna area is likely to take several decades (see above, section 4.2).
We also need to remember that economic growth is obviously only one factor in the potential for the development of an HE system. Quite aside from anything intrinsic to the system, the funding made available from growth has somehow to find its way into HE. There is obviously no guarantee that public or private funding for HE will keep pace with economic development - this depends entirely on national policy choices - but it is at least clear that the potential for increased investment in HE will be there.

(b) Demand for Initial HE

Beyond economics, the most important factor in determining the size of the pool of potential academic migrants in any given system is change in domestic demand for HE consequent on demographic change. According to the UN, the 20-24 year old population of the Bologna area will decline by an average of 1.75% every year between 2005 and 2020. The smallest average annual decline, 0.35%, is in Zone C, but without the effect of projected population growth in Turkey that annual decline would be 1.9%. Zone A is the next most stable with an annual decline of 0.56%. The figure for Zone B is 2.8% and for Zone D 4.4%. These figures are impressive, but we cannot be sure that this population decline will translate directly into a decline in demand for initial HE. In the UK, for example, the decline in the HE-age population is expected to be more significant among the social classes that tend to have a lower level of HE participation. Thus the decline in overall demand for initial HE will be less significant than the decline in the HE-age population (Bekhradnia 2005). At the moment, however, it is impossible to say whether similar effects will be experienced in other countries.

In any case, it is at least very likely that the HE systems of the Bologna Area will find themselves running to stand still in the face of a declining domestic market for initial HE. What happens to student and staff numbers as a consequence will depend entirely on whether the choice is made to allow student numbers to decline, or whether HE systems and institutions try to maintain or increase numbers.

There are only two ways in which student numbers can be maintained. Either domestic participation in HE has to increase, or the proportion of foreign students has to increase. Increasing participation is only likely to be a viable course of action in the HE systems of Zone C, where the average participation rate for initial HE is just over 20%. In Zones A, B and D, participation is already around the 50% mark and it is difficult to envisage this figure progressing much further.

Current differences in funding levels, international reputation and marketing experience are likely to mean that HEIs in Zones B, C and D have much greater difficulty in attracting foreign students to fill the resulting surplus capacity. Even within Zone A, the top three international student recruiters, the UK, Germany and France, play host to over 75% of the total. This represents 60-65% of the total number of foreign students within the entire Bologna area. Only in five HE systems (Switzerland, the UK, France, Germany and Austria) do foreign students represent more than 10% of the total. In the short to medium term, then, it seems very unlikely that HE systems outside Zone A - as well as some within it - can maintain student numbers at their current level. This is not to say that the demographic decline need necessarily be seen as a threat. It could equally well be taken as an opportunity to bring student:staff ratios (SSRs) down to a more manageable level - the average number of students per member of teaching staff is significantly higher in Zones B and C. Reducing SSRs has the additional benefit of increasing the possibility that existing staff will have time to engage in research and professional development. Together with increased investment in HE, this ‘breathing space’ strategy represents a positive alternative to an immediate resort to international marketing efforts, and is virtually guaranteed to bring dividends in the longer term in the shape of a higher quality HE
system which is better placed to attract and retain high quality staff and is more attractive to international students.

Drawing conclusions about mobility from this rather speculative data is clearly very hazardous. However, it does seem probable that for the foreseeable future the Zone A HE systems will be better placed to maintain or even increase student numbers, the more so because the population decline will be less sharp than in the other zones. Other things being equal, an increasing proportion of foreign students should imply an increasing proportion of foreign staff, the pool of graduating students being precisely the pool from which academic staff are recruited. In practice, however, other things are not equal. For example, those countries in which the transition from foreign student to foreign member of staff is not straightforward are likely to find themselves facing a recruitment crisis as the pool of domestic graduates declines. If all of the major HE systems adopt a strategy of trying to maintain student numbers and SSRs in the face of a declining pool of potential members of staff, then in the medium term the academic labour market in the Bologna area will of necessity become more competitive. Again, we can conclude that the effect of demographic change in practice depends on policy and strategic choices.

(c) Factors Specific to the Academic Labour Market

At the same time there are other reasons to believe that the academic labour market is going to become considerably more competitive, although this effect is most likely to be felt in the natural sciences. It is widely thought to be becoming more difficult to recruit students to study science and engineering (Hansen and Soete 2003; Kritz 2006). However, the EU’s much-cited ‘Barcelona goal’ of increasing overall investment in research to 3% of GDP by 2010 apparently implies the recruitment of several hundred thousand additional researchers: “Without the availability of additional highly-qualified research personnel, the aim to double private research investment in eight years time (as put forward in the so-called Barcelona declaration) will merely lead to a tighter labour market, and to the “poaching” of personnel from universities and other public research centres or from other European countries. Looking at the current labour costs for R&D personnel, for example, realisation of the Barcelona objective would imply a need for an additional supply of researchers between now and 2010 of between 560,000 and 800,000 full-time equivalents. This should be added to the specific European problem of an ageing population, which also affects the knowledge sector from the growing shortage of teachers in a large number of European countries to the rapid ‘greying’ of academic staff in practically all European countries” (Hansen and Soete 2003).

The implications for research and development capacity outside Zone A are very serious. There is a large gap between student enrolment in the scientific and healthcare disciplines in Zone A and that in the other Zones. Figures for student enrolment by subject in the Russian Federation are not available, but we know that the situation there is already difficult. Brandi notes that “According to a 1993 OECD study, Russia alone lost more than 500,000 scientists between 1989 and 1991, and the outflow shows no sign of slowing down. Other statistics show that the Russian scientific community lost 37% of its workers between 1989 and 1995. Between 1990 and the first half of 1995, 120,000 Russian scientists, engineers, doctors, dentists, artists, journalists and technicians left their country” (Brandi 2003).

We noted above that decisions about academic migration are more than usually sensitive to difference in working conditions and facilities between the sending and destination countries. Salary is generally thought to be a less crucial factor. Hansen and Soete, for example, found that “International mobility is typically motivated by a desire to engage in quality work with better access to R&D funding and access to leading technology; salary is but one consideration” (Hansen and Soete 2003). However, the differences in the
academic salaries available in the different zones of the Bologna area are so large as to be impossible to discount. Table 10 gives some examples of the salaries on offer.

Table 10: Examples of Salary Ranges in the Bologna Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>€ per year</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>79,733</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>86,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (PhD candidate)</td>
<td>38,400</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>41,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>70,200</td>
<td>56,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (assistant researcher/PhD candidate)</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>25,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>2,967</td>
<td>4,636</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (assistant researcher/PhD candidate)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>52,989</td>
<td>109,430</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (PhD candidate)</td>
<td>11,857</td>
<td>11,857</td>
<td>11,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>13,406</td>
<td>No maximum</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (assistant researcher)</td>
<td>2,688</td>
<td>No maximum</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>55,449</td>
<td>75,566</td>
<td>62,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (teaching-only lecturer)</td>
<td>39,207</td>
<td>49,027</td>
<td>43,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>10,012</td>
<td>40,767</td>
<td>25,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (junior assistant professor)</td>
<td>2,681</td>
<td>4,334</td>
<td>3,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>38,759</td>
<td>74,500</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (assistant researcher)</td>
<td>18,368</td>
<td>18,368</td>
<td>18,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>43,886</td>
<td>120,339</td>
<td>75,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (teaching-only junior lecturer)</td>
<td>27,008</td>
<td>75,555</td>
<td>42,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Most senior post</td>
<td>64,399</td>
<td>No maximum</td>
<td>87,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Least senior post (researcher without PhD)</td>
<td>28,800</td>
<td>43,109</td>
<td>38,485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EI-affiliated HE Staff Unions

Once again, then, we are obliged to recognise that the relationship between change in factors in the operating environment of HEIs and the mobility of academic staff is contingent on policy choices - in the current case, on decisions about the distribution of investment in HE across subjects, and about investment in staff salaries and facilities.

5.3 Obstacles to Mobility

One of our aims in this project has been to discover the extent to which the ‘theoretical’ obstacles we identified in section 2 occur in practice. While the time and resources available for the project were such that a large-scale study was not feasible, two small research exercises were undertaken which permit us to draw certain broad conclusions. The first, focusing on the institutional perspective involved an analysis of the 2004/5 Bologna Process National Reports, the biennial self-assessment of progress submitted to the Bologna Follow-Up Group by national ministries of education. The second, focusing on the staff perspective, was a simple survey of EI’s Bologna Area affiliates in which the unions in question were asked to identify the principal obstacles to the employment of non-national staff in their HE system.
Tables 11 and 12 give the governmental/institutional perspective, indicating the number of times a particular problem or solution was mentioned. These findings not only show the principal concerns in each country, but also give some indication of the way in which staff mobility is understood. What is most striking about the results is the clear ‘gradient’ of problems and proposed solutions from the most basic concerns in Zones C and D, through problems that are arguably associated with high demand for mobility in Zone B, to a more ‘mature’ concern with the processes and career outcomes of mobility in Zone A.

The recognition of the value of periods spent abroad is the second most frequently mentioned problem in the BP national reports, despite the fact that the aspiration to value international experience consistently positively in career decisions is expressed in several research mobility and Bologna-related policy statements, not least the Bologna Declaration itself. In this context it is interesting to note the findings of an evaluation of the experience of Erasmus teacher mobility scheme carried out for Ireland’s Higher Education Authority (Morgan 2004). The author reports that both the academic staff who participated in the programme and administrators working in international offices took the view that mobility for the purposes of teaching had significantly less prestige in career terms than research or other aspects of professional development. This was despite a universally positive response to the experience from the participating staff, who all agreed that their visit had contributed to their personal and professional development.

In terms of policy solutions, the very wide agreement on the need for more funding for academic exchange, together with the second most frequently mentioned solution - increasing the availability of leave of absence with contractual continuity - strongly suggests that the Bologna area ministries of education think of mobility principally in terms of traditional academic exchange.

There is little recognition of the arguably more serious policy problems that arise from indefinite forms of mobility.

Although the survey of staff unions had a slightly disappointing response (9 national responses were received from unions in Denmark, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the UK), the results were nonetheless interesting. What emerged was that formal administrative obstacles are

**Table 11: Mobility Problems Identified in 2004/5 Bologna Process National Reports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Zone A</th>
<th>Zone B</th>
<th>Zones C &amp; D</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Support in general</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career invisibility of periods abroad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa, residency or work permit problems</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff difficulties due to differences in salaries between host and sending countries</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language problems</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to organise and/or fund teaching cover</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family issues</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting travel and other direct costs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension portability</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information problems</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security issues</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12: Mobility Policy Solutions Identified in 2004/5 Bologna Process National Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Zone A</th>
<th>Zone B</th>
<th>Zones C &amp; D</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for exchange schemes from governments, international organisations or NGOs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave of absence with contractual continuity (sabbaticals)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special or preferential arrangements for work &amp; residency permits</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility centres, agencies or offices, both national and HEI-based</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government assistance with obtaining visas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave to teach or development of programmes in non-national languages</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periods abroad privileged in appointment, promotion and other career decisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special taxation arrangements</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language training for both incoming and outgoing staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time abroad counted in calculations of seniority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

considerably less important than informal difficulties in navigating bureaucracies and career systems. Only in three cases, Romania, Spain and Italy, were any significant obstacles reported: Romanian citizenship is required to be eligible for a permanent university post in Romania; in Spain, EU citizenship is a requirement for accession to the civil servant status that accompanies permanent university positions; and in Italy, the only way to avoid the complex series of ‘concorsi’ or competitions that lead to a permanent post - a process which is more or less impossible for non-Italians to navigate successfully - is to be of ‘chiara fama’, which is to say ‘widely recognised reputation’. Whether or not an individual possesses this status is, inevitably, a rather subjective matter.

Otherwise, the requirement to teach in national languages was recognised as one obvious problem for some staff, although the majority of unions reported that an increasing number of courses are being delivered in languages other than the national language. In some cases in Norway and Sweden, foreign staff are permitted to teach in a language other than the national language, but are required to learn it. The respondents in Norway, Sweden and Finland all remarked that although in principle there were no particular barriers to the entry of foreign staff, in practice dealing with the bureaucracy associated with the issuing of work and residence permits could be difficult and time-consuming. Finally, it is worthwhile noting the opinion of the Italian respondent that since the higher education career system in that country is difficult even for Italians to navigate, foreigners are likely to have considerable difficulties in making their way.

The findings of our research into obstacles to mobility is coherent with a view expressed in the European Commission\(^7\) that while there are some areas where there remains a need for legislative change, such as improving the portability of complementary pension rights,\(^8\) in other areas rapid progress could best be achieved by better implementing existing instruments like the European Charter for Researchers and the Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers, and by providing information and training on mobility problems and solutions. However, the legislative changes that would help to promote

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\(^7\) Massimo Serpieri, DG Research. Personal communication, November 2006.

\(^8\) The proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, (20.10.2005 COM(2005) 507 final) is under discussion in the Council of Ministers and the EU Parliament.
mobility are at once highly complex and affect the mobility of all workers, not simply those in HE. In terms of what can be achieved in the BP itself, we have arguably reached the point at which further change and convergence is a matter of the ‘culture’ of HE management at both the system and institutional level. There is a need for system-level and institutional career systems, human resource strategies and practices, and industrial relations machinery to ‘catch up’ with the idea of staff mobility.

5.4 Summary

In this final substantive section of the report we have attempted to interpret what the limited empirical data available can tell us about future patterns of academic staff mobility. We proposed a simple model of indefinite migration that suggests that obstacles and incentives to mobility intervene to modify the migratory flows that would otherwise arise from supply/push and demand/pull factors. Economic growth and development, the overall demand for initial HE and the distribution of that demand across disciplines were identified as the principal factors. We argued that there is every reason to be optimistic about the economic prospects of BP members outside Zone A, but that in many cases convergence was some way off. We also saw that the demographic downturn will be sharper outside Zone A. We then argued that effect of these changes is not given. The relationship between economic growth and HE funding, and that between the demographic downturn and the overall demand for HE depend on policy choices. Principal among these are decisions at national level about HE resourcing and decisions at the level of the HE system and individual HEIs about how demand is managed, particularly with respect to student recruitment and the terms and conditions of academic employment. Many of these choices are in effect choices about how to deal with obstacles to mobility. With respect to strictly temporary mobility - traditional academic exchange - we saw that the problems encountered ‘on the ground’ were principally financial and administrative, but also that there is a widespread problem with the ‘prestige’ attached to mobility for teaching purposes. Finally, we suggested that, in terms of what is possible within the BP itself, the evidence on obstacles to mobility points to the need for convergent change in the cultures of HE management rather than detailed regulation.
6 Conclusions

As things stand, the Bologna Process policy on staff mobility - and in truth, it barely merits the term ‘policy’ - is simply that the manifest need to increase mobility will be met by removing the obstacles to mobility. This is wholly inadequate to the challenge posed by staff mobility. It is neither well-defined, nor well-justified, and in its current form there is a danger that it could be interpreted as a crude demand for the complete deregulation of the academic labour market.

We suggested in the introduction to this report that there was a need to develop, to paraphrase the Council of Europe, a ‘complete and consistently articulated’ vision of academic staff mobility. Such a vision could serve as the foundation of a realistic and effective policy on mobility.

A Complete Vision

The theoretical and empirical evidence we have considered in this report suggests that a complete vision of mobility would include two uncomfortable facts that up to now have been ignored. The first - arising from an economic perspective on HE - is that the deregulatory route to increasing mobility puts less well-resourced institutions at an enormous and possibly permanent disadvantage. Indeed, one of the most important steps the Bologna Process must take is simply to face up to the existing structural disadvantage of the HE systems outside Zone A. It seems very likely that crude, uncoordinated deregulation would exacerbate this disadvantage, making it increasingly difficult for institutions within these systems to attract and retain the best staff. There may be a certain number of institutions that would develop the capacity to compete on equal terms, but it would be likely to remain very small. Beyond the potential for brain drain, it also has to be recognised that the coincidence of large differences in salaries and research resources with dual-status career systems makes it very likely that a kind of academic migrant underclass will emerge in the HE systems of Zone A. Initially happy to have the opportunity to work in a junior capacity in relatively well-resourced institution, migrant staff may end up unable to return home because the skills they have acquired are unusable there, but also unable to construct a proper career in the host system because they do not meet the requirements for higher status employment. Thus migrant staff may become locked into insecure and relatively poorly-paid jobs (EC 2006a). This would be not just brain drain, but brain waste.

The second fact, arising from a socio-cultural perspective, is that the desirability of academic staff mobility and the (concomitant) convergence of HE structures is not absolute. As we argued above, the academic profession is rooted in, and is a crucial contributor to national cultures. Education “is a process of re-learning the collective knowledge of society for each successive generation and... is thus a core mechanism in cultural reproduction and historical social learning and development” (Nunn 2005). The existence within national HE systems of distinctive cultural perspectives on particular areas of knowledge is precisely what gives mobility its value. However, if the mobility of ideas and personnel and the convergence of HE structures is driven solely by economic factors, then it may ultimately lead to a damaging homogenisation of cultures of knowledge and pedagogy along whatever lines the market for HE demands. The most basic principles of academic freedom demand that the objects of teaching and research should be determined not by the market - or in truth, by government and management interpretations of what the market demands - but in conscious and deliberate processes of identity-formation.
In calling for these facts to be recognised, we are certainly not arguing that the BP vision of staff mobility should encompass the idea of a numerical limit on mobility (cf. the policy of ‘restriction’ in Lowell & Findlay’s 6 Rs - see above section 2.2), and still less that there should be some sort of limit on the circulation or exchange of ideas. Rather, we are simply proposing that policies that, \textit{a priori}, seem likely to increase mobility should not be taken as automatically justified. The full range of arguments, both economic and socio-cultural, needs to be taken into account in every case.

\textbf{A Consistently Articulated Vision}

In talking of the need for a ‘consistently articulated’ vision of mobility, what we mean is a set of policies that arises from a realistic analysis of the situation and a single set of underlying values and principles. Policies should be coherent both across borders and between the different levels of coordination, from individual institutions through national HE systems up to the EHEA itself.

On this basis the Bologna policy on mobility should ideally be consistent with the analysis of the situation outlined above - notably the uneven distribution of resources between national HE systems - and with the fundamental principles of academic freedom, equal opportunities for all staff, and equity between HE systems and institutions. We want to suggest that rather than deregulation, this implies a policy of encouraging mobility through a \textit{fair liberalisation} of the academic labour market.

Rejecting the deregulation of the academic labour market does not mean rejecting its \textit{liberalisation}. As Šauvé argues (2002), market liberalisation is not synonymous with deregulation and indeed may involve new forms of regulation or re-regulation. A fair liberalisation of the academic labour market would involve making sure that (properly qualified) staff are able to work where they wish on the same terms as everyone else, regardless of where they are from - whether a BP member country or not - and that institutions in every HE system have a chance of attracting and retaining the best staff, whatever their nationality.

\textbf{Policies for a Fair Liberalisation of the Academic Labour Market}

In the case of the Bologna Process, there are two steps that need to be taken to realise a fair liberalisation of the academic labour market. The first is to encourage an informal re-regulation or convergence of policy on the issues we mentioned in Section 5: student recruitment, career systems, salaries, status and contract types, career structures and criteria for progression, the language of teaching, other human resource strategies and practices, and industrial relations machinery. It will be clear from what has gone before that we do not believe that this can be achieved via formal regulation. Nor are we suggesting here that what is required is agreement on the detail of institutional management. Rather, what we propose is some kind of broad alignment or coordination of approaches in these areas along the lines of the EU researchers’ Charter and Code.

The second step is to ensure that policy on strictly temporary mobility - traditional academic exchange - is consistent with and supports policy on indefinite mobility. As both Nunn and Dedieu suggest, non-market forms of cooperation and exchange can be extremely useful tools for institutions and systems that are for the moment unable to compete on equal terms in the market. Significantly increased funding for academic visits and exchanges - including the new types of ‘virtual’ mobility permitted by developments in information and communications technology - together with a greater willingness to experiment with non-commercial cooperative ventures such as those suggested by Nunn (see section 2.3) would clearly be of enormous benefit.
The question that remains unanswered and that we cannot answer here is how this coordination – more comprehensive and more detailed than anything that has been attempted up to now – is to be achieved.

Conclusion
In essence, our argument is that when it comes to policy on staff mobility, it is not enough simply to take national borders out of the equation and to leave the rest up to the choices of individual members of staff. Rather, the institutions and HE systems in the Bologna area have to recognise and take responsibility for the impact of their actions on the international academic labour market and pursue proactive and concerted policies if mobility is to become a reality. Staff mobility can only be of universal benefit if these actions are properly thought through and properly coordinated at the institutional, national and European levels. The means of building a genuine commitment to staff mobility will need to be addressed in the period following the London interministerial conference, and a proactive mobility policy must be a key permanent feature of the Bologna structure.
References


**Internet Resources**


